Instances of shared responsibility can be divided into two categories. The first category consists of shared responsibility for mass atrocities caused by joint or concerted action. This can involve concerted action of two or more states; of a state and political or military leaders of armed groups in another state; or of a plurality of individuals. The second category consists of cases when there is no concerted action, e.g. when mass atrocities are committed in a state and other states fail in their responsibility to prevent them, such as the situation in Syria. This chapter discusses both categories, though there are obvious differences in terms of legal principles and processes.
Evidently, responsibility for mass atrocities cannot be seen solely as a matter of state responsibility or individual criminal responsibility, as international organisations or other nonstate actors might be involved at different degrees in what could more aptly be described as processes of collective wrongdoing. 5 However, the responsibility of international organisations or other non-state actors is not addressed here. 6 First, the chapter provides an overview of international efforts to address mass atrocities through ensuring individual and state responsibility (section 2). Subsequently, the primary (section 3) and secondary rules (section 4), as well as relevant legal processes concerning state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility are discussed in more detail (section 5).
Attempts to hold states and individuals responsible for mass atrocities
The international response to crimes committed in armed conflicts, as far as individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility are concerned, has varied widely from neglect to 6 For more information on this issue see inter alia the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on the requiring and exacting responsibility of some sort. 7 That response has fluctuated depending on the political willingness of the main political actors and the capacity of international law norms and mechanisms available. Over time international justice has shifted towards individualising responsibility and punishment, through investigating and prosecuting a limited number of persons, focusing mainly on high-level perpetrators bearing the greatest responsibility. At the same time, state responsibility remains relevant, in part because atrocities may be attributable to states, but primarily because states have the obligation to protect their populations from mass atrocities. Moreover, mass atrocity crimes generally require at least some minimum involvement and use of state structures or their acquiescence therein. Situations of mass violence more often than not involve systemic criminality against certain segments of the population.
8
In relation to the atrocities committed in Cambodia; the former Yugoslavia; Rwanda and more generally in the Great Lakes region; Sierra Leone; Sudan (Darfur); and Syria, it seems that both states and individuals shared responsibility. The international response to these events has varied in terms of accountability mechanisms established, the focus on individual or state responsibility, and the achieved degree of accountability. it must be noted that losing states in WW2 had to pay reparation for the crimes committed and the material damage caused. 10 Eventually, for WW2 a higher degree of accountability was achieved in terms of both state responsibility and individual criminal responsibility for mass atrocity crimes.
The armed conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s also have given rise to complex and lengthy legal processes, involving both individual and state responsibility for mass norms. 32 In the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite case, the ICJ has held that the prohibition of torture is also part of customary international law and that it has become a jus cogens norm. 
Rules on international responsibility for mass atrocity crimes
In those cases where states and individuals are subject to the same norms, in principle both can be responsible. for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community that its breach is recognized as a crime by that community as a whole', thus making a dual relationship with the international community both substantively (its fundamental interests being harmed) and formally (the community should recognise the act as a crime). Draft Article 19(3) gave a series of examples of such crimes, which included aggression, the establishment or maintenance by force of colonial domination, slavery, genocide, apartheid, and massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.
community as a whole implies special consequences. 56 Consequently, Villalpando argues that the 25-year-long discussion on state crimes resulted in the abandonment of that notion, and the importation of the concepts of jus cogens and obligations erga omnes to the realm of international responsibility. 57 Instead of 'abandonment', however, the solution finally adopted by the ILC can also be seen as some sort of a compromise which attaches 'special'
consequences to the crimes of aggression, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
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The ARSIWA identify two separate regimes of responsibility towards the international community as a whole. First, a general regime applicable in the event of a breach of any obligation erga omnes, by which states other than the injured state may claim the cessation of the wrongful act and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, as well as the performance of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the injured state or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. 59 Second, an aggravated regime applicable only to serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law, under which all states have the obligation to cooperate to bring the breach to an end through lawful means, not to recognise as lawful the ensuing situation, and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining it. 60 However, none of these regimes is generally understood as entailing a 'criminal' responsibility on the part of the state. The main aim of these responsibility regimes is to protect commonly agreed community interests through a system of collective action.
The rules of attribution of responsibility and the legal consequences arising from such grave breaches of obligations owed to the international community as a whole thus are specific for states and for individuals. 61 State responsibility has primarily a civil character related to the 56 Villalpando, 'The Legal Dimension of the International Community', n. 31, at 405-406. 57 Ibid., at 409. 
Situations concerning shared responsibility for mass atrocities
The situations concerning shared responsibility for mass atrocities can be categorised as 68 However, Spinedi has argued that treating war crimes or crimes against humanity as crimes committed in a 'private capacity' would mean that such crimes cannot be attributed to the state, and as a consequence the state would not be responsible for those acts under international law. 69 Second, as noted, to the extent that both regimes for responsibility apply, the nature of responsibility is different. The Court observed that the obligations, arising from the terms of the Genocide Convention, and the responsibilities of states that would arise from a breach of such obligations, are 'obligations and responsibilities under international law, and not of a criminal nature'. 70 It can be added that this as such does not preclude shared responsibility.
Third, in particular in case of heads of states and senior state officials, the responsibility of states and that of such individuals nonetheless is very closely related. In the Taylor case, the Trial Chamber of the SCSL took the extraterritoriality of the crimes into account as an aggravating factor, when stating that 'while these provisions of customary law govern conduct between States … the violation of this principle by a Head of State individually engaging in criminal conduct can be taken into account as an aggravating factor'. 71 The Appeals Chamber accepted the tenor of this finding by the Trial Chamber, adding that Taylor's acts and conduct did not only harm the victims of the crimes and their immediate relatives, but fuelled a conflict that became a threat to international peace and security in the West African sub-region. 72 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber noted that Taylor's position as head of state was multifaceted, involving distinct aspects including his leadership role, his further role as a direct participant in the peace process in a position of public trust, and his special status as a head of state who aided and abetted and planned the commission of crimes. 73 Can these findings be read as the SCSL 18 indirectly engaging the international responsibility of Liberia, acting through its head of state, for crimes committed in Sierra Leone? At a minimum, these findings highlight the special position of heads of states in situations of shared responsibility between states and individuals.
The crime of aggression could be seen as bringing together the notion of 'criminal responsibility' of the state and that of the individual concerned. A state can commit a crime against peace and a political finding to that effect can be made by the United Nations (UN)
Security Council, through a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 74 declaring that the conduct of that state threatens international peace and security. At the same time, a state can be found legally responsible by the ICJ for a violation of the UN Charter through the illegal use of force or for rendering support to third parties. 75 The ICC will most likely be able to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression and prosecute individuals for having started an aggressive war, once Article 8bis enters into force in early 2017. 76 This Article applies to a person in a position to effectively exercise control over, or to direct, the political or military action of a state.
Fourth, there are relevant differences in the formulation of principles of responsibilities as these apply to states and individuals. For instance, an important distinction is that while proving the subjective element of mens rea or criminal intent is a crucial part of establishing individual criminal responsibility, for purposes of establishing state responsibility that is not necessary. The ILC has taken the position that fault does not constitute a necessary element of the internationally wrongful act of a state, if fault is understood as the existence, for example, of an intention to harm. 77 An objective, rather than a subjective, test has been endorsed with regard to state responsibility. As a result, it may well happen that in particular cases only states can be held responsible and not individuals or, though more likely, only individuals and not
states. In such cases, the different element of responsibility may preclude shared responsibility. 
Legal processes concerned with international responsibility for mass atrocity crimes
From an institutional perspective there are several separate legal mechanisms for adjudicating cases involving state or individual responsibility for mass atrocity crimes. The ICJ has dealt with a number of relevant inter-state disputes, 78 91 However, the Court also noted that:
The immunity from jurisdiction enjoyed by incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs does not mean that they enjoy impunity in respect of any crimes they might have committed, irrespective of their gravity.
Immunity from criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts.
While jurisdictional immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law. Jurisdictional immunity may well bar prosecution for a certain period or for certain offences; it cannot exonerate the person to whom it applies from all criminal responsibility. . 93 The topic of immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction has been included in the agenda of the ILC. 94 There seems to be general agreement and sufficient state practice that incumbent heads of states enjoy immunity from domestic criminal prosecution in other states. 
Concluding remarks
When it comes to mass atrocity crimes states and individuals are bound by similar obligations, which have a strong basis in both treaty law and in customary international law. In principle, all states and individuals are bound by these legal obligations due to their customary nature. state. 100 Subsequently he has argued that the penal elements, which are more apparent in the case of violations of a class of international obligations 'so essential for the protection of fundamental interests of the international community', are not sufficient to change the nature of international responsibility as a whole, nor even to conclude that the regime of aggravated responsibility is in truth of a penal nature. 101 In his view, the ILC was correct to abandon the misleading vocabulary of criminal law.
It is clear that drawing an analogy between individual criminal responsibility (and that of legal persons) in municipal law and a state's international responsibility for a 'crime' (or for the violation of certain international obligations) leads to a number of theoretical and practical difficulties, and calls into question the very structure of the international society. 102 Ollivier notes that on a practical level the emergence of a criminal responsibility of states is not impossible. 103 As he points out, through saving clauses the ARSIWA do not prejudge future developments, as these Articles were adopted 'without prejudice' to other specific consequences of serious breaches of peremptory norms (Article 41(3) ARSIWA), and to the lawful measures that states other than an injured state may take (Article 54 ARSIWA). 104 Jørgensen has argued that the principle of state criminality is an emergent general principle of international law, which may also be described as an emerging category of customary international law. 105 While international judicial bodies are important for ensuring state and individual criminal responsibility for mass atrocities in their aftermath, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that political mechanisms at the international and the regional level offer venues which are much more flexible and suitable to address situations of conflict. These political mechanisms operating alongside the international judicial bodies can, and should, be used to compensate for the deficiencies of the international legal system.
A closer look at secondary rules concerning mass atrocity crimes shows a close connection between individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility, but at the same time also reveals a number of necessary conceptual differences. At the normative level, while practice before international judicial mechanisms has hammered out most of the secondary rules concerning attribution of responsibility and legal consequences, some of them still remain highly debatable. At the enforcement level, despite the ground-breaking institutional developments of the late 20 th century, there remains an obvious imbalance between the normative content and obligations imposed on states and individuals by primary rules, and the possibility to enforce them. Moreover, without the necessary political commitment and state cooperation, the enforcement of these primary rules on mass atrocity crimes risks remaining an empty promise. The situation of Syria, Libya, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African
Republic, Darfur (Sudan), Ukraine, Myanmar, Afghanistan and other states show that shared responsibility for preventing or stopping mass atrocity crimes might result in a diluted sense of responsibility and lack of accountability for failures. Seemingly, international judicial mechanisms created to deal with mass atrocity situations are bound to face an uphill struggle in upholding the high standards of international justice, while trying to live up to the great expectations placed upon them.
